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Abstract
Modern biomedical, behavioral and psychological inference about cause-effect relationships
respects an ergodic assumption, that is, that mean response of representative samples allow
predictions about individual members of those samples. Recent empirical evidence in all of
the same fields indicates systematic violations of the ergodic assumption. Indeed, violation of
ergodicity  in  biomedical,  behavioral  and  psychological  causes  is  precisely  the  inspiration
behind our research inquiry. Here, we review the long term costs to scientific progress in
these domains and a practical way forward. Specifically, we advocate the use of statistical
measures  that  can  themselves  encode  the  degree  and  type  of  non-ergodicity  in
measurements.  Taking  such  steps  will  lead  to  a  paradigm shift,  allowing  researchers  to
investigate the nonstationary, far-from-equilibrium processes that characterize the creativity
and emergence of biological and psychological behavior.
Keywords: ergodic, longitudinal modeling, nonergodic, stationarity, statistical analysis, vector
autoregression
BOX 1 GLOSSARY
Effect size. The magnitude of the observed effect of an independent variable on a dependent
variable. The effect size obtained for a sample is an estimate of the population effect size.
Gaussian distribution. A frequency distribution that arises from additive processes, is well
defined mathematically, and is assumed to be common in empirical data.
Hurst exponent: A measure of long-range temporal correlations in time series.
P-value. The probability of the same result or one more extreme just by chance if the null
hypothesis is true. When dichotomized according to experimenter-determined tolerance for
false-positive error,  this  value serves as an inverse measure of  the strength of  evidence
against the null hypothesis.
Population. The set of all individuals of a specific type that is to be statistically measured but
is too vast to be sampled exhaustively such that an exact measure of the population cannot
be obtained.
Regression. A family of statistical techniques used to estimate the relationships between a
dependent variable (often called “outcome”) and one or more independent variables (often
called “predictors”).
Replicate. To repeat a procedure using a new sample from the same population(s).
Reproduce. To find the same results when a procedure is repeated using a new sample from
the same population(s).
(Random)  sample. Observations  obtained  randomly  from  a  defined  population  used  to
estimate population characteristics.
Sample size. The number of observations in the sample.
Statistical power. A measure of the capacity of a statistical test to yield a significant result. It
depends  on  the  threshold  for  significance,  size  of  the  expected  effect,  variation  in  the
population,  the  alternative  hypothesis  (one  or  two-sided),  nature  of  the  test  (paired  or
unpaired), and sample size.
Variance. The  spread  between  observations  in  a  sample,  quantifying  how  far  each
observation in the sample is from the mean, and therefore from every observation in the
sample.
Box 2 ERGODICITY
A stochastic process x (t ) can be subjected to two types of averaging: the ensemble average
and the time average. The finite-ensemble average of the quantity x at a given time t  is
⟨ x (t ) ⟩N=
1
N∑i
N
x i (t )                                                  (1)
where  x i is  the  ith realization of  x (t ) and  N  is  the number of  realizations included in the
average. The finite-time average of the quantity x (t ) is
x Δt=
1
Δt ∫t
t+Δt
x ( s)ds.                                                 (2)
If x changes at T=Δt /δ tdiscrete times t+δ t, t+2δ t,… , then Eq. (2) becomes
x Δt=
1
T δ t∑τ+1
T
x ( t+τ δ t ).                                               (3)
An  observable  X  is  ergodic  if  its  ensemble  average  converges  to  its  time  average  with
probability one, such that
lim
N→∞
1
N∑i
N
X i (t )= lim
Δ t→∞
1
Δt ∫t
t+Δt
X ( s )ds.                                      (4)
Hence, a stochastic process is ergodic if any random collection of samples represents
the  entire  process’s  average  statistical  properties.  Conversely,  a  stochastic  process  is
nonergodic when the statistical  properties of that process change with time.  An unbiased
random walk is nonergodic, as its time average is a random variable with divergent variance
about the expectation value of zero. For instance, let us choose at random one of the two fair
coins and then toss the selected coin n times. Let the outcome be 1 for heads and 0 for tails.
Then the ensemble average is ½(½ + ½) = ½, which is equal to the long-term average of ½
for either coin. Hence, this random process is ergodic. Conversely, let us choose at random
one of the two coins: one fair and the other has two heads, and then toss the selected coin n
times. The ensemble average for this case is ½(½ + 1) = ¾; yet the long-term average is ½
for the fair coin and 1 for the two-headed coin. Hence, this random process is not ergodic.
Note  that  ergodicity  is  distinct  from  stationarity.  An  example  of  a  stationary  but
nonergodic process is rolling a dice today. The function x (t ) for all future dates is whatever is
rolled today.  x (t ) is clearly nonergodic given that its expectation value is 3.5,  but its time
average is either 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. Nonetheless, it is stationary. Meanwhile, it is possible to
have an ergodic process that is nonstationary, precisely when the expectation value is static
but the variance. For instance, during a jazzy drum solo, the high-hat cymbal is locked into
position on the drum kit, but the intermittent strikes by the drummer will dramatically change
the size of the oscillations in the cymbal from beat to beat and measure to measure.
Box 3 SIMPSON’S PARADOX
Simpson’s paradox is a phenomenon in which a statistical trend observed at the individual
level (or at the level of groups) either disappears or reverses at the group level (or at the level
of  a  set  of  groups).  The  paradox  can  be  resolved  when  individual  relationships  are
appropriately  addressed  in  the  statistical  modeling.  Simpson’s  paradox  is  especially
problematic  in  biomedical  sciences,  where  trends  observed  at  the  group  level  are  often
fallaciously used to derive inferences about individuals. An often-quoted intuitive example of
Simpson’s paradox is the correlation between typing speed and typos1. At the group level, the
correlation is negative—more experienced typists type faster as well as make fewer typos
(solid black line in Fig. I).  However, at the individual level, the correlation is positive—the
faster an individual types, the greater the number of typos he/she makes (blue dotted lines in
Fig. I). Thus, it would be fallacious to conclude that the relationship between typing speed and
typos observed at the group level holds for individuals. The interested readers can refer to
some of the excellent resources that discuss statistical methods to prevent, diagnose and
treat Simpson’s paradox in point data2–4.
Fig. I. Relationship between typing speed and typos. Simulated data illustrating that despite a
negative  correlation  at  the  group  level,  within  each  individual,  there  exists  a  positive
relationship between typing speed and the frequency of typos.
Box 4 STATISTICS FOR QUANTIFYING NONERGODICITY
Ergodicity refers to the resemblance of sample variance to population variance. Statistical
methods often phrase this question as testing how much subsample variances vary from the
bigger sample’s variance, that is, the variance of sample variances. This resemblance can be
considered in two ways: first, in terms of whether the time-average variance of any single
trajectory  resembles  the  ensemble-average  variance  of  those  multiple  trajectories  and,
second, in terms of whether the time-average variance of a subset within a single trajectory
resembles the time-average variance for the entire single trajectory.
Consider a sample of participants, each flipping a coin repeatedly 200 times. If  we
assume that each coin is fair, and each participant performs the flips similarly, the variance in
outcomes  should  presumably  resemble  each  other  in  the  long  run.  We  can  test  this
assumption  by  looking  at  any  one  participant’s  flipping,  taking  the  variance  for  that
participant’s  whole  sequence,  and  comparing  it  with  the  variance  across  all  participants.
Deviations in that participant’s flips might suggest a weighted coin or a systematically different
flipping method. If that participant’s flipping behavior does not resemble the average behavior
across all  participants,  then ergodic assumptions fail.  Of course, each participant is more
likely to deviate from a larger subsample of participants. So, it is possible to examine variance
across progressively larger subsamples of individuals (e.g., 1 participant alone, 2 participants,
4 participants,  and so forth) and test how quickly subsample-average variance converges
towards whole-sample-average variance. Now, we can also consider how well subsamples of
any one participant’s flipping outcomes resemble the variance across the whole sequence:
because  the  small-sample  bias  likely  makes  variance  unstable,  we  do  not  expect  all
subsamples of 5-flips sequences to yield the same estimated variance as the entire 200-flips
sequence. However, we can evaluate the average variance for gradually longer subsets (i.e.,
for 5-, 10-, 20-flips sequences, and so forth) and evaluate ergodicity as the speed at which
the  variance  across  these  subsets  converges  towards  the  variance  across  the  whole
sequence.
To  our  knowledge,  the  most  precise  way  to  portray  ergodicity  is  through  a
dimensionless  statistic  of  ergodicity  breaking  EB—also known as the  Thirumalai-Mountain
(TM) metric5—that subtracts squared total-sample variance from average squared subsample
variance and then divides by the total-sample squared variance (Fig. II).
EB ( x (t ) )=
( ⟨ [ δ2 (x (t ) ) ]2⟩− ⟨δ 2 (x (t ) ) ⟩)
⟨δ2 (x (t ) ) ⟩2
                                      (5) 
which  is  zero  in  the  limit  t→∞ if  the  process  is  ergodic.  In  effect,  this  statistic  phrases
deviation of squared subsample variance from squared total-sample variance as a proportion
of squared total-sample variance. Evidence for ergodicity is the rapid convergence of this
statistic  to  zero  for  progressively  larger  samples.  Slower (or  non-)  convergence indicates
weaker (or non-) ergodicity6. Here, we would like to caution about ergodicity breaking using
an example from economics. Models of relative wealth (i.e., what proportion of total national
wealth  an individual  owns)  often assume ergodicity,  that  is,  fast  convergence to  a stable
asymptotic distribution. This assumption can be upheld against all evidence: it gives answers,
puts numbers on parameters. It is when we work outside this assumption that we find that it is
unjustified7.  Hence,  sometimes  we  may  not  see  a  fast  convergence  to  any  asymptotic
distribution, sometimes no convergence at all.
***
Fig. II. Ergodicity in additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). (a) A representative trajectory of
while noise and ensemble average of N = 1024 such trajectories. (b) Variances of individual
trajectories,  as  well  as  time-averaged and ensemble-averaged variances across  all  1024
trajectories  (the  latter  two  are  the  same  for  AWGN).  (c)  Ensemble-averaged  variance
calculated over differently-sized trajectory subgroups. (d) The ergodicity breaking parameter
EB versus time t.
The universe is not ergodic.
—Sean Carroll
Introduction
Scientific advancement depends on the reproducibility and validation of research findings.
Poorly reproducible studies can impede and misdirect scientific progress, jeopardize funding,
and lead to harmful clinical applications. Growing awareness among the scientific community
about lapses of reproducibility in biomedical sciences8–11, including psychological sciences12,13
and  neurosciences14–17 have  inspired  recent  developments  like  the  Nature  series  entitled
“Challenges in irreproducible research,” the Reproducibility Initiative, a global project intended
to  identify  and  reward  reproducible  research
(http://validation.scienceexchange.com/#/reproducibilityinitiative), and increased transparency
and data sharing practices18–20. Although we loud these efforts, the focus has mostly been on
the fallacies of P-values21,22,  small  sample size23,24,  inaccurate estimation graphics25,26,  and
reporting biases27. A fundamental problem pervasively linked to the lack of reproducibility in
human subjects research—inherent  in  standard analytical  techniques—that  remains to  be
considered is nonergodicity, the paucity of group-to-individual generalizability3,28–32. Crucially,
despite  the  expectation  that  group  treatments  will  inform individual-level  interventions  or
outcomes, human-subjects research may take ergodicity for granted when it should not. Here,
we aim to address how recognizing and quantifying nonergodicity holds great promise for
supporting future scientific progress.
Biomedical, behavioral and psychological studies infer from statistical tests conducted
on aggregated data. This policy rests on the assumption that group-level statistical effects can
be applied to understanding the physiology and psychology of an individual—that is,  they
assume  that  the  study  phenomenon  is  “ergodic”28–30,33 (Box  2).  Ergodicity  holds  when
individual-level variability is homogeneous in resembling variability at the level of the group (or
“ensemble” in statistical-physical parlance) and when individual-level variability is stationary,
exhibiting homogeneous mean and variance over time2,34,35. Unfortunately, the differentiation
of form and behavior inherent to biological structure violates the assumptions of homogeneity
and stationarity, respectively, inevitably making it nonergodic. This violation is no peripheral
nuisance but follows systematically from all of our most unambiguous attempts to distinguish
life as an evolving, innovating, and adaptive process distinct from non-living processes36. The
second condition, stationarity, rules out most physiological and psychological processes with
time-varying moments (mean function, sequential covariance function) of being ergodic (e.g.,
heart  rate  variability,  motor  control,  developmental  processes,  learning  processes,  and
transient  brain  responses)37.  Sample-level  statistical  modeling  that  assumes  stationarity
where it  is  not,  cloaks artifacts of nonstationarity or fails to articulate systematic changes
producing  nonstationarity,  obscures  any  genuine  individual  differences,  and  jettisons  any
generalizable  truths  we  might  have  gleaned  from the  same  diversity  initially  intended  to
represent the population. In these circumstances, deriving inferences from statistical  tests
conducted on aggregated data might profoundly threaten our goals of scientific consilience
and completeness. It certainly makes the suspicious compromise of enforcing similarity and
ignoring diversity for the sake of formal convenience.
Here we argue that behavioral,  psychological,  and neuronal  processes unavoidably
violate the ergodic assumptions, with reference to typically-studied phenomena. We discuss
how,  for  this  reason,  a  significant  body  of  work  in  these  fields  falls  short  on  scientific
investigation’s fundamental objectives, ranging from the failure to reproduce research findings
to the inability to test hypotheses about nonlinear far-from-equilibrium dynamics. We explain
why  finding  meaningful  ergodic  observables  is  essential  for  investigating  nonergodic
processes, and we introduce a few strategies that allow this transformation.
Behavioral, physiological, and neuronal processes can violate ergodic assumptions
Despite multiple calls about the perils of violating ergodic assumptions29,31,32,38,39, extant work
in biomedical sciences has been mostly based on best-practice guidelines almost exclusively
based on statistical inferences from data aggregated across large samples. Whether couched
in prosaic terms or using formal mathematical theorems, the violation of ergodic assumptions
questions the validity of this work. Here we provide a few examples of research areas that are
particularly vulnerable to the violation of ergodic assumptions.
 Physiological sciences  . One area in human physiology where nonergodicity has been
shown  to  be  particularly  important  is  the  biophysical  transport  of  liquids.  Such
nonergodic  processes  include  hemodynamics  and  intracellular  and  extracellular
transport  of  complex  media  in  biological  systems,  such  as  cytoplasm  and
nucleoplasm40,41.  For  instance,  to  reach every cell,  the blood must  enter every cell
continuously in the temporal domain. Due to the  fractal organization of the vascular
network, the blood flow decelerates at small length scales (i.e., in finer capillaries). The
blood cells spend more time at small volumes in comparison to the volumetric fraction
of these volumes, making these systems nonergodic. Consequently, calculations using
the time fraction, (corresponding to the time average) do not apply to calculations using
the volumetric fraction (corresponding to the ensemble average)42.
 Behavioral  and  psychological  sciences  . A well-known  phenomenon  from  cognitive
psychology in which the individual- and ensemble-level findings often conflict is the
speed-accuracy trade-off43. Changes in the speed-accuracy tradeoff form the bedrock
of motor learning44.  Although speed and accuracy show negative correlation across
individuals,  individuals  show a  negative  relationship  between  speed  and  accuracy,
reflecting differential use of strategies to achieve the task goal45. Indeed, people often
use multiple cognitive/motor strategies to achieve the same task goal, exhibiting an
adaptive  combination  of  accuracy  and  speed46.  This  phenomena  is  analogous  to
Simpson’s  paradox  (Box  3),  which  is  ubiquitous  in  behavioral  and  psychological
sciences. In a classic study, Siegler47 identified three factors that can lead to incorrect
conclusions  about  data  averaged  over  strategies:  1)  Relative  frequency  of  each
strategy.  The  more  frequently  a  strategy  is  used,  the  greater  its  influence  on  the
average  data.  2)  Relative  variability  of  performance  from  each  strategy.  Among
strategies producing unequal variance on the dependent variable, the one with higher
variance will have a larger influence on the average data. A less frequent strategy can
have a greater influence if  it  leads to a much higher variance.  3) Variability in the
relationship  between  independent  and  dependent  variables  within  and  across
strategies. A high correlation between the smallest addend and the performance can
falsely indicate that the strategy with the smallest addend was used more frequently
than it was. Hence, psychological studies might overestimate the relationship between
a set of variables at one level over other level(s) due to the clustering of strategies
more often than commonly thought2.
 Neurosciences  . In  neurophysiological  studies,  neuronal  spikes  show  temporal
fluctuations all along the stimulation period. The rate coding paradigm assumes that
these fluctuations do not contain any information. So, this paradigm eliminates such
statistical fluctuations by averaging over many trials. Indeed, the assumption is that the
central nervous system is obliged to make an ensemble average over many neurons
with  the  same  function,  that  is,  neuronal  spiking  is  ergodic.  However,  arguments
supporting ergodicity in spike trains are weak. For instance, one argument posits that
approximately 30 neighboring neurons may form a functional unit, effectively encoding
the  same  stimulus48.  The  central  evidence  supporting  this  conjecture  is  that
neighboring neurons receiving shared inputs belong to the same functional unit 48–50.
However, because neurons require chain-reaction, they cannot resemble each other.
Neurons also receive heterogeneous inputs from neighboring neurons and hence show
nonergodicity.  For instance, if  in a population of neurons that  show a synchronous
peak in firing rate at the ensemble level, the timing of the peak drifts from trial to trial,
then  averaging  the  single-cell  firing  rate  over  trials  would  not  show  any  peak.  In
contrast, in a coupled network of heterogeneous neurons, each neuron may show a
peak at a different time that does not drift with trials; in this case, ensemble-average
firing  rate  can  be  flat  because  population  heterogeneity  will  mask  the  peaks  for
individual  neurons.  Hence,  neurophysiological  studies  based  on  ensemble-level
averaging of neuronal spiking data might violate the ergodic assumptions, portraying
an erroneous picture of neuronal function at the single-cell level51.
Thus, diverse mechanisms rooted in the geometry of the biological system (e.g., fractal
structure of the vascular network, multiplicative interactions among cognitive processes, and
heterogeneity in neuronal connectivity) lead to nonergodicity. Indeed, nonergodicity is more
likely to be overlooked when studying such biomedical systems, particularly when obtaining
long observations of time series is not feasible. Processes that involve some growth, such as
development  and  aging,  and  are  naturally  susceptible  to  practical  constraints  of  data
collection, are particularly vulnerable to such oversight 29,32.
Neglecting ergodic assumptions undermines the scientific enterprise
The widespread mistreatment of nonergodicity in biomedical and psychological sciences has
substantial epistemic and practical consequences, ranging from none in the case of the few
ergodic  processes  in  nature,  to  catastrophic  if  a  process  is  highly  nonergodic.  Indeed,
neglecting ergodic assumptions might jeopardize the scientific community’s very many efforts
in  addressing the challenges of  P-values21,22,  small  sample size23,24,  inaccurate estimation
graphics25,26,  and  reporting  biases27.  In  many  cases,  these  consequences  set  back  the
following four very objectives that form the bases of these research areas:
 Failure to replicate  research findings  . Failures to replicate research findings might be
baked into the potentially incomplete, but broadly sweeping failure of human behavior
and measurements of such class of systems to conform to the standard of independent
and  identically-distributed  behavior  around  the  mean  value.  In  place  of  this
assumption,  to  remove uncertainty  in  the  measurement,  the  standard  technique  is
average across time to extract the true value. Although this process yields a reliable,
temporally stable value, this temporal stability is no guarantee of later reproducibility:
performing  the  same experiment  again  will  yield  a  different  result  every  time.  For
instance,  we  will  find  that  time-averaging  Brownian  motion  over  time  will  yield  a
progressively  smoother  trajectory.  This  result  will  lead  us  to  believe  that  it  has
converged to some fundamentally true value, but repeating this exercise will yield a
different value52. The ergodic hypothesis is especially apt in dealing with the processes
that visit all possible states in a finite sample space. For instance, a good model of the
numbers that show up in roulette wheel is is closely ergodic. The probability distribution
of numbers (0 to 36) that have come up in the past is the same as the probability
distribution of numbers on the next spin. In contrast, if a human participant is asked to
say a number between 0 and 36, that participant might show systematic bias towards
smaller or larger numbers. The bias might also depend on exogenous factors such as
the context,  surroundings, and time of the day53,54.  Therefore, a good model of  the
numbers  produced  by  humans  is  nonergodic,  as  the  human  behavior  defies  the
ergodic  assumption  of  independent  and  identically-distributed  behavior  around  the
mean value. Applying ergodic statistics to these nonergodic processes leads to wrong
conclusions.
 Fa  ilure  to  probe  nonlinear  dynamical  principles  underlying  the  study  phenomena  .
Ergodic statistics at  best can describe the effects of manipulations on the outcome
variable assuming ergodicity holds. They are not equipped to decipher the nonlinear
dynamical  principles  underlying  the  study  phenomenon.  The  ergodic  assumption
implies that a given manipulation for a participant in a study is always mediated by the
same components,  in the same manner,  to link it  with some measured output.  An
alternative view is interaction-dominant dynamics (IDD): component-causal chains are
not the causal building blocks of behavior but are themselves soft-assembled; that is,
they emerge out of and do not exist independently from task constraints55,56. Ergodic
statistics that contrast distinct groups of treatments with a between-participant design
do not allow to trace IDD-related effects of time or influences of task changes that
could lead to phase-transitions between conditions leading to different interpretations
of the same treatment.  Consequently,  the assumption that  consecutively measured
values of behavior or physiology are interdependent violates the IID-assumption such
that the variance of a measured observable cannot be parsed into specific, stable, and
generalizable sources of variance reflecting the dynamical  principles underlying the
study phenomenon. Indeed, cognitive science has been explicit that when we instruct
human participants to generate replicable behaviors in sequence, our instructions are
in vain: “When the optimal strategy in a task is to provide a series of independent and
identically  distributed  responses,  people  often  perform  suboptimally”57.  So,  for
instance, if we leave human participants to count off seconds without any feedback
from a clock, their behavior will be relatively non-ergodic, suggesting that their sense of
how long a second lasts will narrow and dilate across time.
 Failure to test hypotheses about nonlinear, far-from-equilibrium dynamics  . The ergodic
assumption of equivalence between the ensemble average and the time average of an
observable is a key component of equilibrium dynamics. When this assumption is valid,
dynamical  descriptions  can  be  replaced  with  much  simpler  probabilistic  ones,
essentially  eliminating  time  from  the  models.  The  conditions  for  validity  are  often
restrictive  for  non-equilibrium dynamics  and  even  more  so  for  far-from-equilibrium
dynamics.  Biomedical sciences  inevitably  deal  with  far-from-equilibrium  systems—
specifically  with  models  of  growth  and  stability. For  instance,  standing  quietly  and
maintaining focus on a target in front of us is the preamble to very many coordinated
behaviors—we might lean forward and reach or track the target’s progress and bat it
away. However, this starting position is not merely the preamble to action but is already
a  rich  wellspring  of  action  itself,  exhibiting  a  continuous  stream  of  intermittent
fluctuations. So long as they do not pitch the bodily center of pressure (CoP) beyond
the base of support, these fluctuations are crucial to maintaining a quiet stance58,59.
Therefore, it is surprising that the prevailing statistical methods make an indiscriminate
assumption  of  ergodicity,  feeding  the  bias  to  study  systems  while  they  are  in
equilibrium  because  only  then  can  the  behavior  be  measured  to  obtain  a  point
estimate. But nonlinear dynamical systems reveal themselves when they are far from
equilibrium, and this is when the dynamical principles come into play and nonergodicity
reigns. We can take the previous example of participants responding every time they
think a second has passed. If we now give our second-estimating participants a clock
to provide feedback on their accuracy, this task constraint  can make behavior look
significantly  more ergodic60.  Then again,  it  is  when we pose the more open-ended
questions,  not  just  removing  feedback  but  giving  participants  insight  problems  to
prompt more creative response—then we see that the mind at its most creative looks
dramatically  less  ergodic,  with  fits  and  starts,  with  distractions,  and  sudden  “aha!”
moments61.
 Failure to articulate new hypotheses based on the current findings  . A new theory may
suggest  its  initial  hypotheses.  The  scientific  program  depends  on  testing  these
hypotheses and generating new ones in the process. However, if the theory invokes
nonlinear,  far-from-equilibrium  processes  like  emergence,  then  it  presumes
nonergodicity at its foundations. Statistical modeling that assumes ergodicity of raw
measurements in these processes risks undermining such theorizing. If we use a linear
model assuming ergodicity, we never test the original hypotheses about a nonergodic
process. For  instance,  the  emergent  coalition  model  (ECM)  of  word  learning  and
vocabulary  development  predicts  that  lexicon  self-organizes  from  a  coalition  of
exogenous cues62.  Testing the effects of  a set  of  cues in a linear model  assuming
ergodicity  will  always  operate  by  estimating  independent  factors  assumed  to  hold
invariantly  across  time  and  individual  participants.  The  trouble  here  is  that  linear
modeling  is  a  filter  on  our  measurements.  It  presupposes  ergodicity  in  the
measurements entered into the model, and then it estimates sizes and directions of
effects  exclusively  in  ergodic  terms.  Any contingency of  effects  on  time,  space,  or
participant variability must be transparent to the model in terms of our preparation and
coding of the data we feed into the model. For instance, an autoregressive moving-
average model (ARMA) of measurement with trends over time will repeatedly fail to
converge with stable residuals because the inputs are presumed to be stationary. It
requires the scientist either to take the first difference of the data with trends before
running the ARMA model or to change the modeling strategy to an ARIMA (including
the “I” for “integration”) that reflects a modeler’s explicit coding of the linear trend with
time. If the trends are fractional or nonlinear, ARIMA may or may not converge but will
definitely fit the wrong trend and estimate effects for variables that may not exist and
underspecify the complexity of the measurement. The linear filter will not know what
nonergocities it may be missing, and so it will give no insight into the presumed non-
equilibrium mechanisms driving development. Now, in the case of language learning,
when a linear model finds that cue X (e.g., maternal pointing) predicts outcome Y (e.g.,
learning count nouns), then the linear filtering removes any nonlinearity, and suddenly
the  output  looks  as  linear  and  ergodic  as  the  theory  allegedly  predicted  the
phenomenon was not. Nothing about a linear modeling output on learning more count
nouns from maternal pointing will then suggest as to which class of emergent phase
shifts is in play, which populations will exhibit which individual differences in terms of
which count nouns they learn or whether the count nouns they learn align with parallel
syntax  development.  The ergodic  assumptions suggest  that  all  trajectories  are  the
same on average, and all of these cues and subsets of language performance would
be assumed parallel  by any linear  model.  Of  course,  we could come up with  new
hypotheses  about  how  far-from-equilibrium  dynamics  leads  to  a  given  emergent
structure, but ergodic models cannot “see” the underlying nonlinearity and temporal
variation. No matter the rhetoric about nonlinear processes like emergence, unless we
are testing predictions that explicitly nonlinear sources of nonergodicity [e.g., as ARIMA
does  for  linear  sources63] the  linear  models  and  their  independent  and  identically
distributed  estimates  are  themselves  mute  to  nonlinear  dynamical  facts  like
emergence-not just unable to test the initial hypothesis about non-equilibrium dynamics
like emergence but also unable to refine new hypotheses relevant to non-equilibrium
dynamics.
Hence,  all  human  subjects  research  that  ignores  the  nonergodicity  of  study
phenomenon falls short on these four fundamental objectives of scientific investigation. In
basic research, we must not overstate how misleading our impressions might be about the
effects  of  physiological/psychological  manipulations  and  their  interactions.  In  the  clinical
domain, diagnostic tests might be systematically biased, and our classification systems and
treatments/interventions  may  be  at  least  partially  invalid.  In  medicine,  this  calls  for
personalization. For instance, a drug might not be effective unless he has some gene(s). By
testing a large population, one would (correctly) conclude the drug is effective in 90% of the
cases. It would be incorrect to conclude that an individual would respond to the drug 90% of
the time it is tested on that one person—it may be yes/no at the individual level. In studying a
new phenomenon,  we  might  be  not  even  employing  the  research  designs  necessary  to
adequately test the first line of hypotheses, let alone articulate new theories based on the
current findings, as discussed above. We can research with the wrong glasses on, and spend
our careers finding all sorts of effects and inventing nomenclatures without ever addressing a
much more serious, all-encompassing problem. It can be a check-mate situation: irrespective
of decades of research, we may have to throw it all away as invalid because it rests on an
invalid ergodicity assumption.  It is high time that we embrace nonergodicity and teach the
next generation of scientists some nonergodic research designs and statistical techniques.
Here, we side with Molenaar29 that the implications of the classical ergodic theorems imply
that focusing on finer-grained variation is not optional. The systematic violation of of these
theorems in our raw measurements makes this focus a necessity.
Multiscaled estimates of nonergodic measurements can behave ergodically
Effects that look nonlinear and not stable in linear modeling are often better behaved when
the modeling allows causality to unfold across diverse scales. This point does not imply that
an  observed  phenomenon  is  independent  at  different  scales  but  that  linear  models  can
respect multiscaled texture. There are two ways this can happen and might be relevant. First,
mixed-effects modeling allows estimating “fixed” effects for explicit manipulations spanning
the whole task and “fixed” effects of explicit  manipulations that vary across the task (e.g.,
blocks with and without treatment), as well as “random” effects capable of absorbing some
rudimentary ways in which participants might differ in the intercept of their responses and in
the slope of those responses across trials. That said, the references “fixed” and “random” are
misnomers to the degree that very many explicitly randomized manipulations across the task
(e.g., levels of an informational variable) can show the so-called “fixed” effects. For instance,
a given level of an informational variable can show different effects in Block 1 versus Block 2,
and that level could have been delivered on a randomly different trial within those two different
blocks. However, the availability of the “fixed” effect of that informational variable means that
this modeling allows fitting an estimate of the population-level  effect  of  the experimenter-
randomized informational  variable.  Taking this a step further,  we can also test  the “fixed”
effects  of  endogenous  variables  that  participants  bring  to  each  trial  within  each  block,
although not undermining the fact that participants bring individual differences to the task on
each trial. It is only to say that some of the endogenous variety in how participants meet the
task constraints could represent causal  mechanisms generic to the whole population. For
instance, the fact that different participants will direct different numbers of gaze fixations on a
visual display will not prevent a mixed-effect model from estimating the population-level effect
of gaze fixations on visual-perceptual response.
Again, the nomenclature: the random walk (process 3) is not ergodic, but its steps
(process 1) are ergodic. Because its steps are ergodic, so is, for instance, its square deviation
over some fixed interval. Finding meaningful ergodic observables for nonergodic processes is
a hugely important part of doing ergodicity economics, and of doing science in general. This
brings us to the second way we can make linear models respect multiscaled texture, which is
by  coming  up  with  some  form  of  statistics  that  quantify  nonergodicity  can  themselves
empower  ergodicity-requiring  models  (e.g.,  vector  autoregressive,  VAR models)  to  model
what would otherwise be too nonstationary to model. For instance, fractals in the nervous
system:  conceptual  implications  for  theoretical  neuroscience64.  Submitting  raw
position/physiology/kinematic values into VAR models leads to poor convergence because
the residuals are never  serially  independent.  The failure to  converge is  because the raw
values are serially dependent across time for reasons beyond linear correlations. Yes, there
are vector  autoregressive fractionally  integrated (VARFI)  vector  autoregressive fractionally
integrated  moving-average  (VARFIMA)  models  that  can  fit  vector  (i.e.,  multivariate)
autoregression relationships around long-range fractional integration (the “FI” in “VARFI” and
“VARFIMA”)  sort  of  memory65.  But  these  solutions  are  limited:  the  VARFI  and  VARFIMA
models are computationally expensive, and elegant methods like detrended cross-correlation
analysis66, can only treat with two variables and do not estimate unique effects of either.
On the other hand, VAR modeling of fractal and multifractal estimates yields stable
residuals in accordance with the ergodic assumptions, and they have repeatedly shown both
systematic  responses  to  experimental  manipulations  and  predictive  relationships  with
individual  participant  responses67,68.  Although  some  moderate  failure  to  have  serially
independent residuals leaves fractal Gaussian noise (fGn) ergodic, strong failures of serial
independence  (e.g.,  long-range  memory  as  in  1/f  “pink”  noise)  dissociates  the  scaling
properties from any ergodic Gaussian properties (Box 4; Fig. 1)6,68,69.
***
Fig. 1. Nonlinear intermittency in physiological signals is nonergodic. (a) Two representative
trajectories of  healthy  human center  of  pressure (CoP) displacement,  one showing white
Gaussian  noise  (Hurst  exponent,  H =  0.41)  and  the  other  showing  long-range  temporal
correlations or fractality (H = 0.95). Note that a signal shows fractality if 0.5 < H < 1; the closer
H is to 1, the stronger the fractality. (b) The ergodicity breaking parameter,  EB converges to
zero in the limit t→∞ if the signal contains white Gaussian noise but may not converge at all if
the  signal  shows  fractality.  A fuller  treatment  of  the  relationship  between  EB and  Hurst
exponent has been presented elsewhere6.
***
This  latter  point  suggests  something  rather  broad  about  the  potential  future  of
negotiating a constructive rapport between our ergodic traditions and our growing grasp of
nonergodicity. Here, we see an essential bridge to build between the academic’s luxury to
delve into the fine-print entailment of ergodicity and the clinician’s urgency for practical use,
that  is,  between  the  mathematical  curiosity  and  the  need  for  a  clear  interpretation.
Specifically,  the  ergodic  models  that  adjudicate  the  unique  effect  sizes  and  significance
testing are ready to incorporate nonergodic aspects of our measurements. The challenge is to
identify  those  ergodic  estimates  of  nonergodicity,  which  require  taking  the  big-picture
appreciation that, perhaps, what is nonergodic at the fine-grain of our measurements submits
to coarser-grained nonlinear-dynamical quantification. Once ergodically described, as in the
case of multifractal estimates, nonergodicity can swim amidst the same statistical waters as
the  classical  ergodic  measures  that  clinicians  might  be  more  comfortable  with70,71.  For
instance, VAR models can test mutual effects amongst multifractal estimates from the same
system67,68. So at the minimum, ergodic estimates of nonergodicity might be submitted to the
same models that clinicians need to identify valid biomarkers.
An  immensely  useful  possibility  is  that  clinically  most  relevant  measures  of
nonergodicity  might  align  with  the  greatest  ergodicity.  For  instance,  fractal  estimates  of
multifractal, intermittent processes can hover around a mean. While maintaining all statistical
evidence  of  nonlinear  intermittency,  prior  changes  in  fractal  scaling  might  predict  later
corrective effects, hence producing significantly narrower multifractal  variety. This outcome
appears to correlate clearly with a stable reduction of postural sway58,72.  That is,  some of
these measures of nonergodic phenomena can behave ergodically.
Conclusions
Understanding biological and psychological behavior requires a broad range of approaches
and  methods  and  faces  the  fundamental  challenge  of  deciphering  the  “choreography”
associated with complex behaviors and functions. It involves making “sense” of vast amounts
of data of many types at multiple scales in time and space. Basing such a scientific project
upon false assumptions about the nature of the data might be catastrophic. We have made a
case  that  part  of  the  reproducibility  crisis8–17,  and  the  slow  growth  of  knowledge  about
nonlinear,  far-from-equilibrium  dynamics,  can  be  attributed  to  the  violations  of  ergodic
assumptions. We have offered the possibility that both these expectations could immensely
benefit  from  respecting  nonergodicity.  The  stochastic  process  involved  in  the  study
phenomena needs to be made explicit, and the nonergodic data needs to be transformed to
find an appropriate ergodic observable. This new observable can be modeled to obtain stable
statistical outcomes. Taking such steps will lead to a paradigm shift, allowing researchers to
investigate the nonstationary, far-from-equilibrium processes that characterize the creativity
and emergence of biological and psychological behavior.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We  thank  Ole  Peters  for  valuable  suggestions  that  helped  solidify  some  of  the  ideas
presented in this review.
COMPETING FINANCIAL INTERESTS
The authors declare no competing financial interests.
REFERENCES
1. Hamaker, E. Why researchers should think “within-person”: A paradigmatic rationale. in
Handbook of Research Methods for Studying Daily Life 43–61 (The Guilford Press,
2012).
2. Kievit,  R.,  Frankenhuis,  W.,  Waldorp,  L.  &  Borsboom,  D.  Simpson’s  paradox  in
psychological science: A practical guide. Front. Psychol. 4, 513 (2013).
3. Fisher,  A.  J.,  Medaglia,  J.  D.  &  Jeronimus,  B.  F.  Lack  of  group-to-individual
generalizability  is  a  threat  to  human subjects  research.  Proc.  Natl.  Acad.  Sci. 115,
E6106–E6115 (2018).
4. Adolf, J., Schuurman, N. K., Borkenau, P., Borsboom, D. & Dolan, C. V. Measurement
invariance within and between individuals: A distinct problem in testing the equivalence
of intra- and inter-individual model structures. Front. Psychol. 5, 883 (2014).
5. Thirumalai,  D., Mountain, R. D. & Kirkpatrick, T. R. Ergodic behavior in supercooled
liquids and in glasses. Phys. Rev. A 39, 3563–3574 (1989).
6. Deng, W. & Barkai, E. Ergodic properties of fractional Brownian-Langevin motion. Phys.
Rev. E 79, 11112 (2009).
7. Berman,  Y.,  Peters,  O.  & Adamou,  A.  Wealth  inequality  and the ergodic  hpothesis:
Evidence from the United States. Available SSRN 2794830 (2019).
8. Prinz, F.,  Schlange, T. & Asadullah, K. Believe it  or not: How much can we rely on
published data on potential drug targets? Nat. Rev. Drug Discov. 10, 712 (2011).
9. Van  Bavel,  J.  J.,  Mende-Siedlecki,  P.,  Brady,  W.  J.  &  Reinero,  D.  A.  Contextual
sensitivity in scientific reproducibility. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 113, 6454–6459 (2016).
10. Fang, F. C. & Casadevall, A. Retracted science and the retraction index. Infect. Immun.
79, 3855–3859 (2011).
11. Mobley,  A.,  Linder,  S.  K.,  Braeuer,  R.,  Ellis,  L.  M. & Zwelling,  L.  A survey on data
reproducibility in cancer research provides insights into our limited ability to translate
findings from the laboratory to the clinic. PLoS One 8, e63221 (2013).
12. Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science.  Science (80-. ). 349, aac4716
(2015).
13. Gilbert,  D.  T.,  King,  G.,  Pettigrew,  S.  & Wilson,  T.  D.  Comment  on  “Estimating the
reproducibility of psychological science”. Science (80-. ). 351, 1037–1037 (2016).
14. Botvinik-Nezer, R. et al. Variability in the analysis of a single neuroimaging dataset by
many teams. Nature 582, 84–88 (2020).
15. Eklund, A., Nichols, T. E. & Knutsson, H. Cluster failure: Why fMRI inferences for spatial
extent have inflated false-positive rates. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 113, 7900–7905 (2016).
16. Kriegeskorte, N., Simmons, W. K., Bellgowan, P. S. F. & Baker, C. I. Circular analysis in
systems neuroscience:  The dangers of  double dipping.  Nat.  Neurosci. 12,  535–540
(2009).
17. Stikov,  N.,  Trzasko,  J.  D.  & Bernstein,  M.  A.  Reproducibility  and the  future of  MRI
research. Magn. Reson. Med. 82, 1981–1983 (2019).
18. Wallach, J. D., Boyack, K. W. & Ioannidis, J. P. A. Reproducible research practices,
transparency, and open access data in the biomedical  literature, 2015–2017.  PLOS
Biol. 16, e2006930 (2018).
19. Hardwicke,  T.  E.  et  al. Data  availability,  reusability,  and  analytic  reproducibility:
Evaluating the impact of a mandatory open data policy at the journal Cognition. R. Soc.
Open Sci. 5, 180448 (2020).
20. Gilmore,  R. O.,  Diaz,  M. T.,  Wyble,  B.  A.  & Yarkoni,  T.  Progress toward openness,
transparency, and reproducibility in cognitive neuroscience. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1396,
5–18 (2017).
21. Halsey, L. G., Curran-Everett, D., Vowler, S. L. & Drummond, G. B. The fickle P value
generates irreproducible results. Nat. Methods 12, 179–185 (2015).
22. Halsey, L.  G.  The reign of the  p-value is over:  What alternative analyses could we
employ to fill the power vacuum? Biol. Lett. 15, 20190174 (2019).
23. Button, K. S.  et al. Power failure: Why small sample size undermines the reliability of
neuroscience. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 14, 365–376 (2013).
24. Maxwell, S. E., Kelley, K. & Rausch, J. R. Sample size planning for statistical power and
accuracy in parameter estimation. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59, 537–563 (2007).
25. Krzywinski, M. & Altman, N. Error bars. Nat. Methods 10, 921–922 (2013).
26. Ho, J., Tumkaya, T., Aryal, S., Choi, H. & Claridge-Chang, A. Moving beyond P values:
data analysis with estimation graphics. Nat. Methods 16, 565–566 (2019).
27. Ioannidis, J. P. A., Munafò, M. R., Fusar-Poli, P., Nosek, B. A. & David, S. P. Publication
and other reporting biases in cognitive sciences: Detection, prevalence, and prevention.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 235–241 (2014).
28. Molenaar,  P.  C.  M. A manifesto on psychology as idiographic science:  Bringing the
person  back  Into  scientific  psychology,  this  time  forever.  Meas.  Interdiscip.  Res.
Perspect. 2, 201–218 (2004).
29. Molenaar, P. C. M. On the implications of the classical ergodic theorems: Analysis of
developmental processes has to focus on intra-individual variation. Dev. Psychobiol. 50,
60–69 (2008).
30. Lowie, W. M. & Verspoor, M. H. Individual differences and the ergodicity problem. Lang.
Learn. 69, 184–206 (2019).
31. Medaglia, J. D., Ramanathan, D. M., Venkatesan, U. M. & Hillary, F. G. The challenge of
non-ergodicity  in  network  neuroscience.  Netw.  Comput.  Neural  Syst. 22,  148–153
(2011).
32. Molenaar, P. C. M., Sinclair, K. O., Rovine, M. J., Ram, N. & Corneal, S. E. Analyzing
developmental  processes  on  an  individual  level  using  nonstationary  time  series
modeling. Dev. Psychol. 45, 260–271 (2009).
33. Molenaar, P. C. M. & Campbell, C. G. The new person-specific paradigm in psychology.
Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 18, 112–117 (2009).
34. Fitelson, B. Confirmation, causation, and Simpson’s paradox.  Episteme 14,  297–309
(2017).
35. Lerman, K.  Computational  social  scientist  beware:  Simpson’s paradox in  behavioral
data. J. Comput. Soc. Sci. 1, 49–58 (2018).
36. Bains, W. What do we think life is? A simple illustration and its consequences.  Int. J.
Astrobiol. 13, 101–111 (2014).
37. Hasselman, F. & Bosman, A. M. T. Studying complex adaptive systems with internal
states: A recurrence network approach to the analysis of multivariate time-series data
representing self-reports of human experience. Front. Appl. Math. Stat. 6, 9 (2020).
38. Hamaker, E. L., Dolan, C. V & Molenaar, P. C. M. Statistical modeling of the individual:
Rationale and application of multivariate stationary time series analysis.  Multivariate
Behav. Res. 40, 207–233 (2005).
39. Castro-Schilo,  L.  & Ferrer,  E.  Comparison of  nomothetic versus idiographic-oriented
methods  for  making  predictions  about  distal  outcomes  from  time  series  data.
Multivariate Behav. Res. 48, 175–207 (2013).
40. Kulkarni, A. M., Dixit, N. M. & Zukoski, C. F. Ergodic and non-ergodic phase transitions
in globular protein suspensions. Faraday Discuss. 123, 37–50 (2003).
41. Manzo, C.  et al. Weak ergodicity breaking of receptor motion in living cells stemming
from random diffusivity. Phys. Rev. X 5, 11021 (2015).
42. Nosonovsky, M. & Roy, P. Allometric scaling law and ergodicity breaking in the vascular
system. Microfluid. Nanofluidics 24, 53 (2020).
43. Fitts,  P.  M.  The information  capacity  of  the  human motor  system in  controlling  the
amplitude of movement. J. Exp. Psychol. 47, 381–391 (1954).
44. Krakauer, J. W., Hadjiosif, A. M., Xu, J., Wong, A. L. & Haith, A. M. Motor Learning. in
Comprehensive Physiology 613–663 (2019). doi:doi:10.1002/cphy.c170043.
45. Dutilh, G., Wagenmakers, E.-J., Visser, I. & van der Maas, H. L. J. A phase transition
model for the speed-accuracy trade-off in response time experiments.  Cogn. Sci. 35,
211–250 (2011).
46. Pacheco, M. M., Lafe, C. W. & Newell, K. M. Search strategies in the perceptual-motor
workspace and the acquisition of coordination, control,  and skill.  Front. Psychol. 10,
1874 (2019).
47. Siegler, R. S. The perils of averaging data over strategies: An example from children’s
addition. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 116, 250–264 (1987).
48. Shaw, G. L., Harth, E. & Scheibel, A. B. Cooperativity in brain function: Assemblies of
approximately 30 neurons. Exp. Neurol. 77, 324–358 (1982).
49. Vaadia,  E.  et  al. Dynamics of  neuronal  interactions  in  monkey cortex  in  relation  to
behavioural events. Nature 373, 515–518 (1995).
50. Shadlen,  M.  N.  &  Newsome,  W.  T.  The  variable  discharge  of  cortical  neurons:
Implications  for  connectivity,  computation,  and  information  coding.  J.  Neurosci. 18,
3870–3896 (1998).
51. Masuda, N. & Aihara, K. Ergodicity of spike trains: When does trial averaging make
sense? Neural Comput. 15, 1341–1372 (2003).
52. Peters,  O.  & Maximilian,  W. A recipe for  irreproducible  results.  arXiv 1706.07773v1
(2017).
53. Loetscher, T., Schwarz, U., Schubiger, M. & Brugger, P. Head turns bias the brain’s
internal random generator. Curr. Biol. 18, R60–R62 (2008).
54. Hilbert, M. Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: How noisy information processing
can bias human decision making. Psychol. Bull. 138, 211–237 (2012).
55. Wallot, S. & Kelty-Stephen, D. G. Interaction-dominant causation in mind and brain, and
its implication for questions of generalization and replication. Minds Mach. 28, 353–374
(2018).
56. Van Orden, G. C., Holden, J. G. & Turvey, M. T. Human cognition and 1/ f scaling.  J.
Exp. Psychol. Gen. 134, 117–123 (2005).
57. Brown, S. D. & Steyvers, M. Detecting and predicting changes. Cogn. Psychol. 58, 49–
67 (2009).
58. Kelty-Stephen, D. G., Lee, I.-C., Carver, N. S., Newell, K. M. & Mangalam, M. Visual
effort  moderates  a  self-correcting  nonlinear  postural  control  policy.  bioRxiv 209502
(2020) doi:10.1101/2020.07.17.209502.
59. Mangalam, M., Lee, I.-C., Newell, K. M. & Kelty-Stephen, D. G. Visual effort moderates
postural cascade dynamics. bioRxiv 209486 (2020) doi:10.1101/2020.07.17.209486.
60. Kuznetsov, N. & Wallot, S. Effects of accuracy feedback on fractal characteristics of
time estimation. Front. Integr. Neurosci. 5, 62 (2011).
61. Richardson, L. F. The analogy between mental images and sparks.  Psychol. Rev. 37,
214–227 (1930).
62. Hollich,  G.,  Hirsh-Pasek,  K.  &  Golinkoff,  R.  Breaking  the  language  barrier:  An
emergentist  coalition model  for  the origins of word learning. in  Monographs for the
Society for Research in Child Development 65 (3, Serial No. 262) (2000).
63. Box, G. E. P. & Pierce, D. A. Distribution of residual autocorrelations in autoregressive-
integrated moving average time series models.  J.  Am. Stat.  Assoc. 65,  1509–1526
(1970).
64. Werner,  G.  Fractals  in  the  nervous  system:  conceptual  implications  for  theoretical
neuroscience. Front. Physiol. 1, 15 (2010).
65. Kilian,  L.  &  Lütkepohl,  H.  Structural  Vector  Autoregressive  Analysis.  (Cambridge
University Press, 2017).
66. Podobnik, B. & Stanley, H. E. Detrended cross-correlation analysis: A new method for
analyzing Two nonstationary time series. Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 84102 (2008).
67. Mangalam, M., Carver, N. S. & Kelty-Stephen, D. G. Global broadcasting of local fractal
fluctuations in a bodywide distributed system supports perception via effortful  touch.
Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 135, 109740 (2020).
68. Mangalam,  M.,  Carver,  N.  S.  &  Kelty-Stephen,  D.  G.  Multifractal  signatures  of
perceptual processing on anatomical sleeves of the human body.  J. R. Soc. Interface
17, 20200328 (2020).
69. Mangalam, M. & Kelty-Stephen, D. G. Multiplicative-cascade dynamics supports whole-
body coordination for perception via effortful touch. Hum. Mov. Sci. 70, 102595 (2020).
70. Peters, O. The ergodicity problem in economics. Nat. Phys. 15, 1216–1221 (2019).
71. Peters, O. & Gell-Mann, M. Evaluating gambles using dynamics. Chaos An Interdiscip.
J. Nonlinear Sci. 26, 23103 (2016).
72. Kelty-Stephen, D. G. Multifractal evidence of nonlinear interactions stabilizing posture 
for phasmids in windy conditions: A reanalysis of insect postural-sway data. PLoS One 
13, e0202367 (2018).
